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Introduction 
The venue for the 2012 Olympic Games is situated at Stratford in the borough of 
Newham, East London. At the time of writing, the physical and infrastructure projects 
are almost complete and organisational plans to ensure the smooth running of the 
event well underway, a year before the opening ceremony.  New housing, hotels and 
conference centres surrounding the site are also in their final stages of construction, 
giving Stratford a new and unfamiliar skyline. With modern street lighting and 
pavements that are no longer cracked and broken, it feels as if Stratford has finally 
‘arrived’. Once the Games are over, further housing will be constructed to reach an 
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expected total of 50,000 new homes, with 12,000 as affordable housing, and new 
business and retail developments will further add to these new impressions.  
Back in 2005 Jack Straw explained in the House of Commons that the Olympic bid 
was successful because the Games would be ‘a force for regeneration’ and that they 
would transform one of the poorest and most deprived areas of London, create 
thousands of jobs and homes and offer new opportunities for private sector 
organisations (Hansard 2005, quoted in Poynter 2009:141). But what outcomes and 
impacts can we reasonably expect from the Olympic regeneration experiment for the 
most economically and socially disadvantaged? Can the 2012 Games live up to the 
expectations outlined by Jack Straw six years ago?  Can we expect this latest 
regeneration initiative to be more or less successful that its predecessors? 
This paper considers these questions by discussing the plausibility of the 
assumptions which underpin the Olympic project and the governance structures that 
are intended to secure benefits for East Londoners. This approach enables us to 
strip away some of the hype that is typical of mega sporting events which use 
powerful and persuasive narratives and images to portray their ‘legacy’ (see for 
example MacRury 2011). The 2012 Games are no exception and slogans such as 
‘the power of the Games to inspire lasting change’ and ‘transformative momentum’ 
exemplify this idealism. But what practical arrangements are in place to make this 
rhetoric a reality for those living in East London?  
This paper traces the reality of regeneration initiatives that have populated Stratford 
since the 1980s and questions how much learning from previous regeneration 
initiatives has been incorporated into the theoretical propositions that underpin the 
Olympic regeneration experiment. A problems perspective is used to inform the 
discussion, the characteristics of successive regeneration initiatives implemented at 
Stratford reviewed, and the Olympic regeneration approach described to suggest 
that the outcomes for the most disadvantaged are likely to fall well-short of what 
could be achieved. 
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Our approach  
At the Centre for Institutional Studies (CIS) we use a problems approach for policy 
analysis and treat policies and institutions as trial solutions to social problems 
(Popper 1968, 1969; Majone 1980; Burgess 2002).  We find out how problems are 
formulated and how well policies and agencies implementing policies are solving 
them.  How regeneration initiatives identify, understand and give meaning to critical 
factors affecting poverty and disadvantage explains why particular actions are 
chosen rather than others and why particular institutional arrangements and 
governance structures are put in place to deliver policies (see for example Sabatier 
1986, 1999; Hoppe 2010).  Emphasis is therefore placed on finding out if the 
identified social and economic problems have been alleviated, rather than if the 
aims, objectives, targets and outcomes of an initiative have been met (Sampson 
2007). 
The Olympic Games initiative is the latest regeneration project in East London and 
contains a particular formulation of critical factors that explain the persistence of 
economic and social problems and offers a tentative set of actions to alleviate these 
difficulties. Based on past experiences it can be anticipated which causal links 
embedded in the Olympic model are likely to be active, produce harm, or will to be 
unable to generate expected improvements (Sayer 1992; Weiss 1995; Pawson and 
Tilley 1997). Using this approach the plausibility of how benefits will accrue for the 
most disadvantaged and those experiencing inequalities can be assessed.  
Our research 
The analysis for this paper draws on information from several sources; from our 
knowledge and experiences of evaluating social policies and researching in East 
London including Stratford City Challenge, East London Single Regeneration 
programmes, Safer Cities, Youth Inclusion programmes, New Deal for Communities, 
Sure Starts and Children’s Fund (www.uel.ac.uk/cis), a study that outlined how a 
healthy Athletes’ Village may be created and maintained (Sampson et al 2010), and 
an analysis of Olympic-related policy documentation and academic papers. 
These data sources centre the discussion on the original intention of bringing the 
Games to East London to affect poverty, disadvantage and inequalities. The Olympic 
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project has many other anticipated sporting, business and cultural outcomes 
throughout the UK and whilst important to the UK as a whole, the main beneficiaries 
are expected to live and work in East London.   
Regeneration at Stratford  
In the 1980s primarily property led initiatives were exemplified by the Urban 
Development Corporations (UDC) and in particular the London Dockland 
Development Corporation (LDDC) which incorporated south Newham. The LDDC 
was an unelected quango, with responsibilities to regenerate derelict land that is now 
Canary Wharf and an internationally renowned financial district.  Public subsidies 
were used to attract private enterprise and the LDDC was given responsibilities for 
local planning thereby marginalising local authorities and local people. Even though 
the LDDC invested more of its funds in social and community development by the 
early 1990s, new jobs were not taken by local people and they remained socially 
marginalised (Deakin and Edwards 1993; Rhodes and Tyler 1998; Fearnley 1999). 
By the end of the 1980s the property market had collapsed and this approach was 
criticised for its lack of local involvement and failure of local communities to benefit 
(Lawless 1988; Audit Commission 1989; National Audit Office 1990; Turok 1992; 
Imrie and Thomas 1993; Sampson 1998). In 1991 when City Challenge was 
announced it sought to address shortcomings in previous policies and aimed to 
integrate cultural, economic, physical and social regeneration to address a range of 
problems facing disadvantaged areas and bought local authorities back to take the 
lead, although City Challenge was based on a notion of partnership between three 
key sectors – public, private and community (Pratt and Fearnley 1996; Fearnley 
1999). Each City Challenge area was allocated £37.5 million over five years and 
there was an expectation that this initial funding would attract further investment from 
private and public sectors. A key problem identified by Michael Heseltine, then 
Secretary of State for the Environment, was that inner city areas lacked the ability to 
attract investment and compete and City Challenge was intended to give them a 
competitive advantage (Heseltine 1991). 
In 1993 the London Borough of Newham successfully secured funding for Stratford 
City Challenge (SCC) because the bid demonstrated high levels of disadvantage and 
considerable development opportunities on the old disused rail lands.  Stratford was 
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considered uniquely placed as a gateway to East London and there was a strong 
belief locally that a vibrant and thriving Stratford would ‘kick start’ the economy in the 
rest of East London.  The local authority had been lobbying for an International 
Passenger Station (IPS) for several years and it was hoped that City Challenge 
would attract sufficient private investment to start this project.  In the event SCC did 
not lever in as much additional funds as hoped for and the rail lands remained 
largely vacant and the IPS project remained on the drawing board, although 
agreement for a new regional passenger station was secured and was completed 
after SCC had come to an end. 
As the City Challenge initiative progressed it was adapted and a new Single 
Regeneration Budget programme was launched. This programme gave higher 
priority to consulting the community and responding to their feelings of insecurity and 
social isolation, enhancing the role of voluntary organisations, and addressing issues 
which limited local people’s access to new employment and business opportunities 
due to lack of formal education qualifications, insufficient work-related skills and ill-
health. Single Regeneration Budget programmes (SRBs) spawned in areas close to 
the Olympic Park site including; SRB Temple Mills, SRB Leabridge, SRB South 
Leytonstone, SRB Hackney Wick, SRB Fit for Work, Towards Employability SRB. 
Ambitions to bring larger infrastructure projects to the area remained. During this 
time plans for a new Stratford City were developed by the London Borough of 
Newham and a model was put on public display in the Old Town Hall at Stratford for 
inspection and comment. The proposed city was situated on the rail lands, the 
current Olympic site, and was conceptually remarkably similar to the Athletes’ Village 
and Olympic site. But attracting the interest of private investors to construct this new 
city remained a dream, the model city was put in a cupboard and the initiative placed 
‘on hold’. 
SRBs were followed by other national programmes and each was an attempt to 
remedy the errors identified in previous initiatives. Several were located in the 
London Borough of Newham including Safer Cities, Youth Inclusion Programme, 
Children’s Fund, New Deal for Communities, to name but a few. These programmes 
aimed to assist families, children and young people living in particularly 
disadvantaged areas and those with complex needs. Further emphasis was placed 
on involving local people in the planning and delivery to improve the responsiveness 
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of services to their needs, on improving the co-ordination of delivery agencies 
strategically and in practice, supporting voluntary organisations, as well as 
mainstreaming best practices. Evaluations of these programmes found that the most 
vulnerable and those with complex needs benefited from additional and targeted 
resources but that better ways of spreading good practice could be developed to 
engage with the most disadvantaged (see for example Law 2000; Edwards et al 
2006; MHB 2003; CRESR 2005; Belsky et al 2007; Sampson 2007; Themelis and 
Sampson 2009).  
Thus, any assessment of the Olympic legacy will take into account that for many 
years core funding from central government and additional resources from 
regeneration programmes have been invested in the area to achieve better life 
chances for its residents.  Infrastructure projects such as housing developments, at 
Barking Reach for example, improving transport links between west and east London 
with the Crossrail development and a host of initiatives to improve educational 
attainment, work skills and making East London a safer and more attractive place to 
live, work and invest in were all ongoing prior to the announcement of the Olympic 
Games. Indeed some local politicians argue that it was only possible to win the bid to 
host the Olympics in East London due to substantial prior investment and that these 
activities are integral to assessing legacy.  
Regenerating Stratford Olympic style 
How can East London regeneration be assessed? 
Much has been written about how the return on the £9.3 billion public expenditure 
allocated to the Games can be assessed (for example, EdComs 2007; LERI 2007; 
DCMS 2009; Brimicombe et al 2010; Grant Thornton et al 2011, 2011a). These 
reports have elaborate methodologies and list many outputs, outcomes and impacts 
to be measured in order to capture as many benefits as possible. A complex 
methods-driven ‘meta-evaluation’ for the whole project has been commissioned that 
includes a value-for-money component (Grant Thornton et al 2011, 2011a).i 
However, from the perspective of East London and in the context of the discussion 
on the succession of regenerative initiatives in Stratford assessing an ‘Olympic 
legacy effect’ can be simplified to just one issue. This is ‘additionality’ – extra benefit 
or harm – that the Olympic project contributes to bring about an improved 
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understanding of the ‘regeneration problem’ to produce more effective solutions than 
previously. Past experiences at Stratford demonstrate that the continuing 
persistence of economic and social disadvantage means that the ‘regeneration 
problem’ in East London is a ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel and Webber 1997).ii Wicked 
problems are ill-defined, difficult to characterise, evoke many meanings and lack 
consensus about effective solutions, and for these reasons typically recur (Rittel and 
Webber 1997).  A key aspect of ‘additionality’ is therefore to identify any changes in 
the way the regeneration problem Olympic style has been characterised and to 
assess if it is more likely to lead to improvements for those living in poverty and 
experiencing inequality in the immediate and longer term, than previous 
interventions. 
Bringing the Games to Stratford 
In 1997 the British Olympic Association commissioned a feasibility study to host the 
2012 Games in London and when the bid was submitted in 2005 the then Mayor of 
London, Ken Livingstone and the Labour government insisted that it was located in 
East London (Poynter 2009). In fact, just winning the bid to host the Games was 
sufficient to bring to fruition projects which had stalled for many years. The ‘power of 
the Games’ was a commitment from central government, that had previously not 
been forthcoming, to use public funds to invest heavily in Stratford.  The IPS came 
into being, over 20 years after it was initially lobbied for, and the original Stratford 
City, that includes the Athletes’ Village that comprises of 4,500 residential units with 
30% affordable housing, has finally come to fruition too.  Westfield have built a large 
shopping centre with offices, hotels, and a conference centre adjoining the IPS and 
the Athletes’ Village, with the promise of 5,000 new jobs and 8,000 in total.  Most 
importantly for local people who, throughout the Stratford City Challenge years 
lobbied hard for a Marks and Spencer and who got a Wilkinsons and Poundland 
instead, now have a Marks and Spencer, and a John Lewis and Prada as well.  
The contaminated rail lands which lie just beyond the old Stratford City Challenge 
boundaries have also been remediated and reclaimed, businesses in Carpenters 
Lane compulsorily moved, travelling families evicted from the site, and 450 homes at 
Clays Lane demolished.  This space now has numerous ‘state-of-the-art’ sporting 
venues and images of the Olympic Park show that smart inter-connecting walkways, 
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clean canals, and attractive gardens are all on their way. From this perspective the 
promise of the department of Culture, Media and Sport to ‘transform the heart of 
East London’ (DCMS 2008: 3) has been achieved. Physically Stratford has indeed 
been spectacularly transformed. 
Governance structure: who is responsible for ensuring that local people are lasting 
beneficiaries? 
The governance structure of the Olympic project has been described as complex, 
with a lack of clarity about which agency is responsible for delivering particular 
legacy goals and where accountability lies (GLA 2010). Nevertheless, identifying 
where responsibilities lie for the East London legacy gives an insight into the 
practical application of hypotheses that predict how the Olympic infrastructure and 
living in poverty are connected. 
An action plan arose from the Legacy Masterplan Framework, and projects are 
delivered by the London Development Authority (LDA) who are responsible for 
commissioning projects and which are overseen by the East London Legacy Board, 
a seemingly large and unwieldy body consisting of 31 local, regional and national 
agencies. Originally the only project to remain beyond 2013 was the Olympic Park 
Legacy Company (OPLC) which will be reconstituted as a Development Corporation.  
The OPLC is responsible for the management of the sporting venues, setting up new 
businesses, and overseeing the construction and management of mixed tenure 
housing, the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, for which 7,000 new homes are 
planned. Its ‘success indicator’ is to ensure that ‘the Olympic Park can be developed 
after the Games as one of the principal drivers of regeneration in East London’.  The 
OPLC has many similarities with the LDDC, although with a narrower remit; it is 
centrally controlled and managed, local planning regulations have been ‘relaxed’, 
and the active participation of local people in planning and delivering is largely 
absent. Concerns have already been expressed that the repeat of this state-led 
approach is likely to have similar detrimental social consequences for local residents 
(Poynter 2009:147). There is a clear presumption that when the infrastructure 
projects are completed and the management of the Olympic Park put in place, then 
economic, social and health benefits will naturally follow, just as night follows day. 
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The original legacy plans for East London assumed that benefits will automatically 
flow to local people.  
However, it is 40 years since the inception of the LDDC and the indices of 
deprivation 2010 ranked Tower Hamlets, the borough within which the Canary Wharf 
development is located, as the 3rd most deprived area with 60% of its wards amongst 
the worst 10% in England, and with the highest proportion of children living in 
poverty (ONS 2011; see also HBU 2009; Brimicombe et al 2010). Without this 
development poverty in Tower Hamlets may be even worse, but the continuing high 
levels of disadvantage challenges the presumption that strong links naturally occur 
between large scale infrastructure investment and economic and social marginality 
even in the longer term. 
The Olympic legacy presumption of ‘trickle down’ was contested and in January 
2010 leaders from five East London host boroughs, Newham, Hackney, Waltham 
Forest, Tower Hamlets, and Greenwich, publically criticised the government for 
failing to produce a credible legacy plan for East London and produced their own 
Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF).iii Following political pressure the SRF was 
adopted and the delivery of the SRF is now included in the legacy plans. Central 
government pledged its support for its organising principle, convergence, that states 
‘within 20 years the communities who host the 2012 Games will have the same 
social and economic chances as their neighbours across London’ (HBU 2009). But 
this commitment occurred after the majority of the Olympic Delivery Authority's 
budget had been spent and how its action plan can be effectively put in place is 
therefore uncertain (GLA 2010).  The SRF is supported by a Host Boroughs Unit 
(HBU), located in Hackney Town Hall, and by the end of 2010 the Unit became 
embedded in the Olympic Games governance structure. Once a year the HBU 
reports to the Chief Executives Board and to the East London Legacy Group  which 
was established by the Greater London Authority (GLA) and which in turn  reports to 
the Olympic Regeneration Steering Group. The HBU remains the only agency with a 
remit across all East London boroughs and one which is wholly informed by 
democratically elected representatives. 
The SRF initiative is also different because it will exist beyond 2013 and its remit 
includes addressing familiar social and economic issues that account for poverty and 
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inequality; poor educational attainment levels and low aspirations, low pay and 
unemployment, insufficient access to affordable housing, high rates of violent crime 
and poor health (HBU 2009). It assumes that direct investment is necessary to 
create and maintain causal links between constructing large infrastructure projects 
and accruing social and economic benefits for local people. But there has been little 
financial backing from central government to support this approach. For three years 
the Host Boroughs Unit received a grant from Department of Communities and Local 
Government of £150,000 but this was terminated in the financial year 2011/12. This 
financial cutback occurred at a time when public expenditure has also been cut and 
local authorities reduced their contributions to cover salaries and running costs. 
Currently only three part time staff are responsible for implementing the SRF 
convergence agenda, and two full time and one part time staff have responsibilities 
for employment issues. The HBU is, in essence, a ‘shoe string’ operation.iv  
Investing in effective practices: outside the Olympic regeneration model 
The lack of co-ordinated working across East London boroughs has been identified 
in the SRF as a critical issue and part of the regeneration problem (SRF 2009) and 
the 2011 SRF progress report signals that the main effort of the HBU has been co-
ordinating strategic cross- borough working (HBU 2011). It may be anticipated that 
the more efficient use of resources across the boroughs arising from this strategy, 
with its potential benefits for local people, can be attributed directly to an ‘Olympic 
effect’. That is because the boroughs came together to challenge the proposed 
Legacy plan, to draw up an alternative and persuade central government to adopt 
their convergence agenda. Arguably without the Olympics the HBU would not exist.  
However, a finding from our Stratford City (Athletes’ Village) study was that 
practitioners considered ‘strategy was too high’. They wanted practical guidance, 
and reflected that decisions made at a strategic level about what happens ‘on the 
ground’ can be misinformed and unhelpful (Sampson et al 2010). Having 
responsibilities for delivering services on an Olympic site creates particular anxieties 
and challenges. Practitioners were keenly aware that their actions would be heavily 
scrutinised by the media and they frequently mentioned that the ‘stakes are high’ and 
that what happens will ‘make or break reputations’.  In public settings these 
practitioners created an aura of confidence and spoke with authority, making 
11 
 
statements such as ‘we have a track record of success’, ‘we know how to do this 
from our experiences of working in x[name of place]’ and ‘well, of course, we use 
best practice’. But research studies signify a gap in our knowledge about how best to 
reach out to, and engage with residents to create lasting tolerance and 
understanding in new planned mixed communities and integrate existing and new 
communities (Sampson et al 2010). Knowing how best to implement effective 
participatory decision-making to address the social determinants of ill-health and to 
reduce health inequalities is another challenge (Marmot 2009). In essence, 
practitioners wanted to know more about what to do and how to do it. There was also 
a concern that additional resources are required to address new problems that have 
arisen as a result of the Olympic project. But neither the government-led approach 
nor the convergence perspective are directly investing in improving effective 
practices nor ensuring that these practices are embedded throughout East London. 
Looking forward:  there is still time to achieve better outcomes with greater 
certainty  
Stakeholders in the Olympic project will undoubtedly be able to claim legacy 
achievements. Many of the East London ‘success indicators’ will be achieved by 
2013 as the infrastructure projects will have been completed and the expected 
gentrification will be sufficient to achieve targets such as improved educational 
attainment levels, higher skills and income levels, and increased participation in 
sport and exercise.  
However, the presumption that ‘trickle down’ and ‘ripple out’ effects from the Olympic 
site will bring economic and social benefits to the most disadvantaged does not have 
a good track record in East London and it appears that there has been a collective 
memory loss or denial about the lessons learnt from previous initiatives. Unless the 
Olympic regeneration model is underpinned by better propositions that make strong 
links happen between activities in one small area to those living in poverty in East 
London as a whole, and resources are allocated to activate these connections, 
claims that a ‘convergence’ agenda has been achieved due to the Olympic 
regeneration initiative will lack credibility. To date there is scant evidence that much 
attention has been given to an improved understanding of critical factors affecting 
the wicked problems to produce better longer term solutions for the most 
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disadvantaged and, as a consequence, it is uncertain that it will produce better and 
more sustained solutions. It is highly likely that any ‘additionality’ from the Olympic 
experiment will fall well below its potential.  
There is still time to draw on lessons from the past and to adapt the Olympic project 
in order to increase confidence that benefits will accrue to the most disadvantaged 
within a reasonable time frame. A re-assessment of the role, funding and support for 
the Host Boroughs Unit would be an obvious starting point. But time is running out 
and the matter is urgent.  However, without a willingness to accept current 
shortcomings and the political will to make changes the promise of the Olympics 
inspiring lasting change will be a false promise. 
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i
 The evaluation frameworks are typically focussed on rationale and calculating value rather than inquiring if 
the Olympic Games have shifted or alleviated the problems the initiative intended to address. 
ii
 The Multiple Deprivation Index 2007 showed that the six host boroughs were within the top ten most 
deprived London boroughs and within the top 10% most deprived boroughs in England, that they were below 
the London average for educational attainment at Key Stage 2 and GCSEs, and have a greater proportion of 
people with no qualifications than the London average, as well more ill-health and levels of household 
overcrowding between 18% and 38% which is significantly higher than the London average of 7% (Thornton 
Grant et al 2011a:58; see also Brimicombe et al 2010). 
iii
 Barking and Dagenham joined in 2010 to become the sixth host borough. 
iv
 A comparison between the Strategic Regeneration Framework launched in 2009 and the 2011 up-date 
reveals that planned work on key poverty indicators has not been actioned and that many of the convergence 
activities are reliant on the activities of the Host Boroughs without additional input from the HBU including 
youth crime and initiatives in areas with concentrations of worklessness (HBU 2009). Unsurprisingly activities 
to support the intentions set out in 2009 ‘to reduce the inequality gap in outcomes between disadvantaged 
groups and social classes with the average for London’ have been significantly curtailed (HBU 2009). 
